With the increased awareness of the potential of RFID technology across a range of applications and as a new source of information emerge new points of attack. Due to cost issues most proposals focus on securing the RFID reader rather than the tag. This paper investigates some of the low-cost proposals for securing RFID tags from potential misuse through authentication and encryption.
INTRODUCTION
Despite common misconceptions, Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) systems have been around since the 1940s with the British using RFID like systems to distinguish between friendly and enemy planes (RFID, 2005) . Early evidence of the technology appears in Stockman (1948) which called for further research into the remaining basic problems in reflected-power communication. While RFID research was still in its infancy, the advent of bar-coding systems in the 1970s had a profound effect on a large number of different industries and has become the most recognised and used auto-identification system today (Sarma, Weiss & Engels, 2002) .
This dominance of bar-coding systems may soon be at an end with the realisation that through the use of RFID technology a range of new possibilities exist. RFID systems are currently used for such purposes as:
Animal Identification Systems (Neary, 2002) -RFID sensors are embedded in animals to allow each animal to be uniquely identified;
•Product Tracking (Sarma et al., 2002) -RFID sensors where attached to individual items to allow real time product monitoring;
•Long range access control of Vehicle systems (OnStar, 2005) ;
•Prisoner tracking systems in gaols (Best, 2004 ) -Prisoners in the Ross correctional facility in Ohio will be required to wear wristwatch size RFID tags to allow movement tracking.
In addition to the implanting of Animals with RFID chips several plans for the use of RFID technology in human subjects have been trialled (Kanellos, 2004) . The implanting of RFID chips has several uses in areas such as, preventing identity fraud, people based building access systems, and the storage of medical data. Currently the Baja Beach Resort in Spain uses an implanted RFID chip as a way for their clientele to purchase resort services without having to carry cash or other forms of verification (Jones, 2004; Baja Beach Resort, 2005) .
For the present RFID systems remain too expensive to completely penetrate all possible markets, with typical transponders costing around US$0.50 -US$1.00 (Sarma et al., 2002) . However, with mass production coupled with an open standard, supporters aim to bring the price down to around US$0.05 -US$0.10 which would see RFID integration into almost every facet of life. Even if RFID technology is only used to replace bar-coding systems, there are still over five million barcodes scanned daily (Weis, Sarma, Rivest & Engels, 2003) .
RFID BASICS
Radio frequency identification (RFID) technology stems back to Faradays' discovery that light and radio waves were both forms of electromagnetic energy (figure 1). As previously stated, the first concrete step towards the modern conception of RFIDs was made by Harry Stockman in his 1948 paper Communication by means of reflected power (Stockman, 1948) . Although it was not until 1973 the first direct patent on passive RFID tags was lodged in America by ComServ (Cardullo, 2005) . A timeline of major RFID related events is shown in figure 1 (created from data in Engels, 2004) . RFID tags now come in various shapes and sizes including stick on labels, tie-on tags, 3mm pellets, and button disks although internally, they consist of a microcontroller and attached antenna embedded in a protective material. Every RFID system consists of three major components (Sarma et al., 2002, p. 3):
RFID Reader
•"the RFID tag, or transponder, which is located on the object to be identified and is the data carrier in the RFID system,"
•"the RFID reader, or transceiver, which may be able to both read data from and write data to a transponder," and •"the data processing subsystem which utilizes the data obtained from the transceiver in some useful manner".
The RFID transceiver emits a radio frequency carrier signal, when the transceiver is placed within range of a transponder; the antenna of the transponder detects the electromagnetic field. The transponder's microcircuit then activates causing the antenna to fluctuate in a coded sequence in such a way to transmit its encoded data. This transmission is then read by the transceiver and utilised by a data processing subsystem.
RFID Antenna
RFID systems employ two types of antenna, Dipole for the reception of electric fields and Loop, for reception of magnetic fields. Loop antennas consist of one or more loops of conductive material. This type of antenna uses a magnetic field known as an inductive or near field which loses its strength after a short distance, thus is suited for RFID applications that allow the RFID transponders to be placed very near the transceiver (figure 2).
Figure 2. Loop Antenna RFID Tag System (Adapted from Wild, 2005)
The near field signal that a RFID transponder emits is reduced in strength proportional to the distance cubed, as with all near fields (Pope & Loukine, 2004, p.3) . This gives a range approximately one -sixteenth of the carrier wave length, which would be around 1.38 meters for a 13.56 MHz tag (Cole, 2004; Wild, 2005) . Dipole antennas (figure 3) consist of two conductive strips around one quarter of the wavelength of the transmitted signal in length (Wild, 2005, p.8) . They produce an electric 'far' field in addition to a magnetic near field which affords a greater broadcast distance as electric fields dissipate at a lesser rate than magnetic fields. The actual dissipation of an electric far field is a quartering of the signal strength as the distance from the antenna is doubled -6dB per doubling of distance (Macleish, 2002) . (Wild, 2005) Active versus Passive Tags RFID tags or transponders may be either passive or active. Passive tags have no on tag power and are thus only able to use the electromagnetic energy transmitted by the transceiver to power the microcontroller. Due to their reliance on transmitted power passive RFID tags have only small transmission areas ranging from a few antenna centimetres to around fifteen meters for the UHF tags. The price for passive tags is also comparably small with prices varying from around $0.50 (US) to $5.00 (US) per tag.
Active tags have an additional power cell used to provide power to the RFID microcontroller. The inclusion of a power source provides active tags with several advantages over their passive counterparts such as the ability to receive lower power signals or to output stronger signals than would otherwise be possible. The higher signal strength means that active tags are able to transmit over greater distances up to around 100 meters. With the added benefits that the active tags bring, also comes a shelf life. Modern tag battery life varies from one to ten years according to usage and data transfer settings. Also, while only slightly larger in size than their passive equivalents, active tags are considerably more expensive ranging from twenty to three hundred dollars per tag (Wild, 2005) .
SECURING RFID TAGS
RFID tags are typically a silicon-based microchip. Functionality beyond simple identification upon request may be achieved including integrated sensors, read/write storage, encryption and access control .
The downside to such operations is the increased production cost of the RFID tag away from the ideal market penetration cost of $0.05 (US) -$0.10 (US) quoted earlier, thus RFID security is often focused on reader security ignoring the obvious avenue of attack. Irrespective of the security focus, no single security or encryption standard for tags or readers has been adopted and thus many systems remain insecure.
Sarma, cite the problem of RFID tagged underwear and medicine as an example where shoppers who had RFID purchases could be unwittingly revealing their preference in undergarments and illnesses to an attacker. Other more plausible attacks such as corporate spying by scanning a rivals' inventory to gain a picture of stock levels and thus make inference on sales are also suggested (ibid). Thus if RFID systems do not include a method of verification between tags and readers, they will accept all communication as valid. Several proposed solutions to such problems have been suggested and while no one proposal has been adopted, there have been four major solutions that allow for low cost tags.
Hash-Locking Tags
Weis et al. (2003) proffer a security solution while minimising tag cost in the form of a one way hashing algorithm where each tag has a portion of memory reserved for a 'meta-ID'. To lock a tag, the system writes the hash of a random key to the meta-ID which is then stored by the authorised user along with the key in a secure database. The tag then enters a locked state and will not respond until it is unlocked with the transmission of the correct key, which it compares to the hash stored in its meta-ID. Once unlocked the tag responds normally to any reader within broadcast range, the functionality of this approach is demonstrated in figure 4 .
Figure 4. Hash-Locking of RFID tags
Such a method would increase the difficulty of unauthorised reading of the contents of locked tags, however once a tag is unlocked it remains as vulnerable as any other non hash protected tag until relocked. Weis et al. (2003) do warn that such systems may be vulnerable to spoof attacks where tags are queried to gather meta-IDs which are later provided to a legitimate transponder which replies with the unlock key that will allow the access to a 'secured' tag. While currently nothing would prevent such a spoof attack on the system the occurrence of the actual spoof may be detected by the repeated lack of response of an acceptable tag identifier by the spoofing attacker.
Minimalist Encryption Approach
Juels (2003) proposes a method dubbed 'minimalist cryptography' which uses a small amount of re-writable tag memory and the very limited tag computational power to implement the encryption. The method is built upon the assumption that "an adversary may only interact with a given tag on a limited basis before that tag is able inturn to interact in a protected manner with a valid verifier" (Juels, 2003, p.8) . This assumption requires that every tag protected by the system is within range of a RFID reader unit that is out of range from an attacker, and as such severely limits the practicality of the approach.
The approach relies upon RFID tags storing a short list of random identifiers (referred to as pseudonyms). For each query the tag receives, it will transmit the next pseudonym in the list and then return to the beginning of the list when the last pseudonym is transmitted. For each unique pseudonym ( i) there exists a query key ( i) and an α β authentication key ( i). The valid transponder contacts a tag through the broadcast of a query key ( i) unique to γ β the relevant pseudonym ( i) after tag based authentication has occurred the tag responds with ( i). As these α γ values rotate and differ between each tag it reduces the probability that an eavesdropping attacker will discover the entire range of ( i), ( i) and ( i) for an individual tag.
α β γ Additionally Juels (2003) suggests several ways of increasing the size of the pseudonym set on the tags through time dependant pseudonyms and other such methods. However, each of these methods increase the processing overhead required by an individual tag and thus makes tags more expensive. While not unbreakable, such a security system would prevent or at least discourage attacks from casual parties who would be the RFID equivalent of 'script kiddies'.
Universal Re-encryption Approach
Saito, Ryou & Sakurai (2004) propose a system of re-encryption based upon the work of Golle, Jakobsson, Juels & Szyddlo (2004) which does not require knowledge of a public key for re-encryption. In this system transponders query RFID tags which reply with identification information via cipher text (C) encrypted through universal re-encryption (ibid). The cipher text (C) is then used by the transponder along with a private key (x) to query a database which stores data on the individual tag. The tag is then sent a newly generated cipher text which is generated via the database for its next use.
Mathematically the protocol of the approach may be shown as (Saito, Ryou & Sakurai, 2004, p.882 ):
•Secret key (x)
•Public key (y = gx)
•Cipher text (C = [( 0, 0); ( 1, 1)]) generated using a message m, a public key y and a random α β α β number r = (k0, k1) so that:
• 0 = myk0 α
This approach forms a PGP type encryption for RFID systems but is more vulnerable to attack than its wired based counter part. Additionally such a standard would increase the cost of RFID readers and require that all systems had a key database which if cracked would give an attacker full control over the RFID system and all its tags.
Hopper Blum Authentication
Weis (2005) suggests that a form of human-computer authentication may be adapted to provide security in RFID technology. While Weis (ibid) fails to explain how such a method would be implemented in an RFID system the technique will be detailed as claims have been made that an implementation will be forthcoming in the next year (Weis, 2003, p.4) and Weis himself is an notable researcher in this field. The aim of his research is to adapt this approach to allow users of RFID systems to manually authenticate tags. While such an application would be time consuming it might allow for the development of secure RFID tags that could be personally secured by an individual rather than requiring a more expensive solution and thus should be considered when looking at attack methods and vulnerabilities to examine if such proposals are viable.
The Hopper-Blum (HB) protocol is based on the 'learning parity with noise' (LPN) problem which states: "Given an q × n matrix A, where q is a polynomial of n in size, a q-bit vector z, and a noise parameter (0, ½), ή є find an n-bit vector x such that |Ax-z| q" (Weis, 2005, p.3) . Despite the seeming mathematical complexity of ≥ the definition the actual procedure for the HB protocol is based on simple calculations that may be done using mental arithmetic as demonstrated in Tollinger (cited in Weis, 2005) where a vending machine was setup to dispense free soft drinks to students who could master the protocol.
The protocol is based on two parties sharing a random n-bit secret which will be referred to as x. If party A wishes to check party B then a random challenge is sent in the form of a {0, 1}n. Both parties then compute the є boolean inner product a . x, denoted by a parity bit which we will refer to as z. Party B then responds with z to party A who accepts only if both z values match. As a and x are random an unauthorised source would still be able to guess the correct z value fifty percent of the time, to combat this Weis (2005) suggests that the procedure be repeated a given number of times q. If this is followed then an intruders chances of guess every answer correctly is reduced to 2-q.
While reducing the probability of guess based attacks the multiple challenge approach means that any attacker passively scanning and capturing O(n) repetitions could easily calculate x through the use of Gaussian elimination. This is tackled using the injection of false responses or noise into the z transmissions by party B. If a pre-agreement exists then party B will only send the correct response for rounds (the agreed fraction) and an ή incorrect response for the other responses. Authentication is only given if the exact fraction of correct rounds q ή and incorrect rounds (|1 -|)q are achieved. ή
Even this layer of additional complexity is not completely safe from attack; a passive eaves dropper has a small probability of success if system operations are known i.e. if an attacker has prior knowledge of q. That if all q ή challenges are captured and the responding parity bit z are stored in a matrix M then x may possibly be solved using the form |Mx-z| q. Thus while not impossible to solve the security is increased based on the difficulty ≤ ή of solving the aforementioned LNR problem. Weis (2005) estimates that for a key space of n = 128 even the most efficient algorithm would need 256 computational steps (72, 057, 594, 037, 927, 936) .
CONCLUSION
The four security proposals discussed have all suggested methods of securing RFID tags from unauthorised access. The limitations due to cost on the computational power of RFID tags represents a real threat to the security of RFID systems. Modern attacks on wireless networks are growing in sophistication and frequency and have lead to a large body of cautionary literature on wireless use in critical infrastructure. RFID systems are poised to replace many elements of critical infrastructure especially in product tracking systems and yet no clear standard has been adopted for securing transmissions between RFID transceiver and transponders. Through the consideration of security proposals, many vulnerabilities which have not yet been documented in their own right may be discovered.
